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ABSTRACT.- Production of desirable outputs is often accompanied by undesirable by-
products that have damaging effects on the environment, and whose disposal is frequently 
regulated by public authorities. In this paper, we compute directional technology distance 
functions under particular assumptions concerning disposability of bads in order to test for 
the existence of what we call ‘complex situations’, where the biggest producer is not the 
greatest polluter. Furthermore, we show that how in such situations, environmental regula-
tion could achieve an effective reduction in the aggregate level of bad outputs without reduc-
ing the production of good outputs. Finally, we illustrate our methodology with an empirical 
application to a sample of Spanish tile ceramic producers. 
Key words:  environmental regulation; efficiency; disposability of bads. 
JEL Classification: C61; D21; L68. 
1. Introduction 
The analysis of firms’ environmental performance and the assessment of the costs of abat-
ing undesirable by-products that frequently come jointly with production of desirable goods, 
are receiving growing attention by both academics and policy decision-makers. Furthermore, 
environmental issues are also becoming a major matter of concern for firms’ managers. 
From the eighties onward, a growing literature has arisen devoted to incorporating envi-
ronmental issues into traditional production theory, which has, to date, produced a wealth of 
contributions (see Tyteca, 1996 and Allen, 1999 for a review). On the one hand, some studies 
have focused on adjusting conventional productivity indexes to allow for undesirables into 
the output vector. Pitman (1983) pioneered this line of research by using econometric tech-
niques to calculate shadow prices for undesirable outputs, which were used to compute an 
index of productivity change that accounts for environmental effects. Färe et al. (1993) calcu-
lated firm-specific shadow prices of undesirables from the computed parameters of an output 
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distance function. Afterward, this methodological approach has been applied in numerous 
papers, Coggins and Swinton (1996), Swinton (1998) and Reig-Martínez et al. (2001), among 
others. On the other hand, a second strand of the literature has addressed the issue of extend-
ing the traditional efficiency analysis framework (Farrell, 1957) to explicitly account for the 
presence of undesirable outputs. Färe et al. (1989) suggested the computation of hyperbolic 
productive efficiency measures under both strongly and weakly disposable technologies, to 
measure the impact on firms’ performance of lack of free disposability of wastes, e.g. due to 
environmental-friendly regulations. Other interesting papers that analyse environmental and 
economic performance are Ball et al. (1994), Brännlund et al. (1995), Färe et al. (1996), Ty-
teca (1997), Hernández-Sancho et al. (2000) and Zofio and Prieto (2001). 
In recent years, it has emerged a renewed interest in measuring environmental performance 
together with pollution abatement costs arising from public regulations aimed at achieving 
determined standards of environmental quality. A number of papers, including that by Chung 
et al. (1997) and Ball et al. (2001), have proposed the use of directional distance functions 
(Färe and Grosskopf, 2000; see also Färe and Grosskopf, 2004) as an useful tool in modelling 
production theory in presence of undesirables and, particularly, in assessing environmental 
performance. Some other studies have used directional distance functions to explicitly calcu-
late the costs of abating contamination. Färe et al. (2003) interpret pollution abatement costs 
as the foregone production of good outputs that results from the reallocation of productive 
inputs to pollution reduction activities, i.e. resources that otherwise could be addressed to 
good output production. Furthermore, Picazo-Tadeo et al. (2005) utilise directional technol-
ogy distance functions to calculate productive-oriented efficiency measures under both 
strongly and weakly disposable technologies, which are used to compute firm-specific re-
duced production of goods resulting from regulations that prevent free disposal of residuals. 
This paper differs from Färe et al. (2003) by scaling both goods and inputs, instead of scaling 
only good outputs. 
In this paper, we propose to consider in more detail the use of directional distance func-
tions in assessing firms environmental performance and the opportunity cost of pollution 
abatement. Particularly, we show that computing directional distance functions under certain 
assumptions concerning disposability of undesirables, allows to identify what we call com-
plex situations, where the biggest producer is not the greatest polluter. In such situations, 
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firms can increase their production of goods reducing bads, and regulating authorities could 
achieve an effective environmental regulation without affecting firms’ desirable production. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section two deals with methodological 
issues. Section three describes the data and discuses the empirical application. Finally, section 
four concludes. 
2. Methodology  
Introducing some notation, let us consider that production technology is defined by the set of 
feasible input, ( ),..., ,...,= ∈ I1 i I +x x xx R , and output, ( ),..., ,...,= ∈ J1 j J +y y yy R , vectors: 
( ){ },  can produce S = x y x y        (1) 
Traditional production theory assumes that the properties of the production technology are 
the following (Shephard, 1970; see also Grosskopf, 1986): 
a) Inactivity. 
a.1) Possibility of inaction: ( ), ∈S0 0       (2) 
It is technological possible not to produce. 
a.2) No free lunch: ( , ) ;∉ >S0 y y 0       (3) 
Positive quantities of inputs are required to produce positive amounts of outputs. 
b) Strong disposability of inputs (SDI). 
( ) ( ), , , ,+∀ ∈ ∈ ⇒ ∈ ≥I if S Sx R x y x' y x' x      (4) 
It is feasible to produce the same amount of output using a bigger quantity of any input, 
i.e., the inputs excess can be disposed at no cost. 
c) Strong disposability of outputs (SDO). 
( ) ( ), , , ,+∀ ∈ ∈ ⇒ ∈ ≤J if S Sy R x y x y' y' y      (5) 
Any feasible output can be freely disposed. 
d) Convexity. 
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The linear combinations of feasible production plans are also feasible. 
Furthermore, let us assume that production of desirable outputs comes jointly with 
undesirable by-products, and that the output vector can be partitioned into a sub-vector of 
desirable or good outputs, ( ),..., ,...,g g g g G1 g G +y y y= ∈y R , and a sub-vector of undesirable or bad 
outputs, ( ),..., ,...,b b b b B1 b B +y y y= ∈y R , so that ( ),= ∈g b J+y y y R . 
In order to introduce joint production of good and bad outputs into the characterisation of the 
technology, two additional axioms are usually assumed, null-joint production (Shephard and 
Färe, 1974) and weak disposability of outputs, both desirable and undesirable (Färe and Primont, 
1995). Formally, these axioms are formulated as: 
e) Null-jointness. 
, , 0 0g G b B b g+ +∀ ∈ ∀ ∈ = ⇒ =y R y R y y       (7) 
If some good outputs are produced, then some bads will also be produced. 
f) Weak disposability of outputs (WDO). 
( ) ( ), , , , , , , 1α α α+ +∀ ∈ ∀ ∈ ∈ ⇒ ∈ ≤g G b B g b g bS Sy R y R x y y x y y   (8) 
Proportional reduction of good and bad outputs is feasible, but the isolated disposal of bad 
outputs may not be. 
The axiom of WDO constitutes a reasonable way of recognising that reducing undesirables 
may not be a free activity, as traditional production theory assumes. Conversely, when firms 
face environmental-friendly regulations, disposing undesirable outputs involves a cost that 
could be measured in terms of opportunity as a shrinkage of the maximum attainable produc-
tion of goods from a given endowment of resources (Färe et al., 1989). In other words, inputs 
that otherwise could have a productive use, i.e. production of desirable outputs, have to be 
diverted to reduce or eliminate undesirable outputs in compliance with the environmental 
regulations. 
Our next theoretical building block is the directional distance function (DDF). This function 
generalises both input and output Shephard’s distance functions, providing a complete 
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representation of the production technology (Färe et al., 2000 summarise the theory and main 
applications of these functions). In presence of undesirable outputs, the DDF is defined as: 
( ) ( ), , ; , , Sup , ,g b g bg b g bx xy y y yD g g g g g g Sβ β β β⎡ ⎤− − = − + − ∈⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦x y y x y yr  (9) 
( ), ,= − −g bx y yg g gg  being the direction vector. 
Directional distance functions model joint production of desirable and undesirable outputs, 
allowing for increasing goods while simultaneously reducing bads, along a path previously 
determined through a particular direction vector. Accordingly, the DDF of expression (9) in-
flates the vector of good outputs in the gyg  direction and contracts the vectors of inputs and bad 
outputs in the − xg  and − byg  directions, respectively, while staying within the set of technologi-
cally feasible productive plans S. Furthermore, it can be proved that1: 
( ) ( ), , ; , , 0 , ,− − ≥ ⇔ ∈r g bg b g bx y yD g g g Sx y y x y y      (10) 
The computed DDF for a particular decision making unit measures its level of technical ef-
ficiency2. If the DDF equals to zero, the productive unit under evaluation is efficient in the 
Farrell-Debreu notion3. In other words, no other peer has been found that yields greater vec-
tor of good outputs with little consumption of inputs and smaller level of bad outputs. 
Under the set of assumptions made concerning the technology, and imposing variable re-
turns to scale4, for a productive unit O, the DDF of expression (9) can be computed solving 
the following linear programming problem (see Färe et al., 2003): 
                                                          
1 Other relevant properties of DDF are summarised in Chambers et al. (1998). 
2 Computed scores of technical efficiency must be considered here as measures of productive-oriented effi-
ciency, rather than output- or input-oriented efficiencies, given that the directional distance function expands 
goods simultaneously reducing inputs. 
3 Here, we follow the well-known Farrell-Debreu notion of efficiency. There exist, however, another more exi-
gent concept of efficiency: the Pareto-Koopmans efficiency (see Färe et al., 1994 for details). 
4 Other properties concerning the nature of the scale properties of the technology could also be assumed (see 
Banker et al., 1984). 
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where: 
• , go ox y  and boy  are, respectively, the vectors of inputs, good outputs and bad outputs 
corresponding to the productive unit under evaluation, i.e., firm O. 
•  r WDBOD  is the computed DDF when bads are assumed weakly disposable (WDB), 
• z is an activity vector denoting the intensity at which observed productive units are con-
ducted in constructing the technological frontier, 
• J, G and B are three matrices containing the observed vectors of inputs, good outputs 
and bad outputs, respectively, 
• e is a vector of ones, and, finally, 
• δ  is a parameter restricted to be within zero and one. 
The strict equality in (11)-(iii) and the parameter δ  on the right hand side of restrictions 
(11)-(ii) and (11)-(iii), assure the accomplishment of the axioms of null-jointness and WDB 
when variable returns to scale are imposed. Likewise, good outputs are freely disposable, ac-
cording to inequality (11)-(ii). 
Färe et al. (2003) refer to program (11) as regulated, provided that bad outputs can not be 
freely disposed. Conversely, when firms face no environmental rules, instead of weak dis-
posal, the axiom of strong disposability of undesirable outputs constitutes a convenient char-
acterisation of the technology since it allows to model the idea that firms can freely dispose of 
undesirables. In other words, strong disposability can be interpreted here as the plausible as-
sumption that in absence of regulation firms will not bear the cost of disposing in a socially 
acceptable way of its undesirable output. Thus, the unregulated version of program (11) is: 
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Computation of program (12) yields the DDF under the axiom of strong disposal of bads 
(SDB), i.e., when, in absence of regulation, firms do not face costs for the free (strong) dis-
posal of bad outputs. Furthermore, SDB has been introduced transforming the equality (11)-
(iii) into the inequality (12)-(iii) and removing the parameter δ . 
Figure 1 provides some intuition of the evaluation of programs (11) and (12) based on a 
simple diagram. In order to make things easier, let us assume that all productive units present 
the same inputs vector to produce one good output and one bad output. Also, let us consider 
that the direction vector takes only the good output expansion direction. Formally, this direc-
tion vector is: 
( ) ( ), , 0,1,0= − − =g bx y yg g gg        (13) 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Being productive unit A inefficient5, by expanding to the maximum level of good output with 
the same level of bad output, the DDF computed assuming that environmental rules prevent free 
disposal of bads, i.e., the solution to program (11), locates point A on the technological frontier 
at point ' WDBAA A D= +
r
. In contrast, when there is not environmental regulation and firms can 
dispose of undesirables at no cost, program (12) finds point " SDBAA A D= +
r
 as the benchmark for 
the good output of productive unit A. Nevertheless, as it is technologically infeasible for produc-
tive unit A to reach point A”, in real terms its benchmark is B (note that ''g gB Ay y= ), but the strong 
disposability axiom, i.e., lack of environmental rules, permits to freely dispose the increase in 
bad outputs, which is measured by ( )b bB Ay y− . 
                                                          
5 Notice that, under the particular direction vector considered, technical inefficiencies should be interpreted as 
output-oriented inefficiencies, because this vector expands goods for given endowment of inputs.  
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Having these results and following Picazo-Tadeo et al. (2005), we define the regulatory im-
pact index as the difference between efficient projections of good output on both regulated 
and unregulated technological frontiers. Formally, for decision making unit O, this index is: 
( )= −v vSDB WDBO ORegulatory impact index D D       (14) 
The regulatory impact index of expression (14) measures losses of good output due to 
regulation and takes values equal or greater than zero. Value zero means that environmental 
regulations are not binding and regulation is not hindering strong disposability of undesirable 
outputs. Conversely, a positive index indicates that regulation hinders free disposal of bads. 
Let us assume now that the situation is the symbolized in Figure 2, where the biggest polluter 
is not the biggest producer. We call it the complex situation. In this new scenario, productive unit 
B continues being the maximiser of the good output, but units C and D generate a greater amount 
of bad output, while producing a lower level of good output. 
[Figure 2 about here]  
In spite of the fact that economic literature on the measurement of environmental perform-
ance runs into hundreds of papers, few attempts have been made to explain why we might 
observe productive units like C and D. Perhaps, the easiest way to justify this behaviour that 
apparently seems to be somewhat counter-intuitive, is to affirm that, although observed, these 
observations are simply outliers due to measurement error. Furthermore, despite that the theo-
retical framework of efficiency measurement assumes that all observations have access to the 
same technology, it can be argued that points like C and D could be representing productive units 
using older, and also dirtier, technologies. Our perspective here is a little different since we con-
sider that, at least, two additional reasons could justify the existence of such points. 
• On the one hand, imagine a technology generating a fixed level of bad output, irrespec-
tive of the level of production of the good output (being similar to what a fixed input is). 
If, in the short term basis, a drop in the demand implies that units C and D use a poor 
level of their productive capacity, these units are going to be inefficient because of their 
sub-activity, although this sub-activity does not imply any reduction in their environ-
mental impact. 
• Figure 2 could be expressive of the short run, being the long-run situation what is pre-
sented in Figure 3. In this new picture, we observe the extension of the efficient frontier 
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until unit E (the biggest producer with the highest environmental impact), but, from the 
short-run perspective, we do not observe the presence of productive unit E. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
In the empirical illustration we carry out in the next section, we have a cross-section dataset 
for a sample of Spanish tile producers, so that we deal with a complex situation corresponding to 
the short-run situation symbolised in Figure 2. In this case, application of programs (11) and 
(12) to units C and D yields the following results: WDB SDBC CD D 0= >
v v
 and WDB SDBD DD D 0= =
v v
. 
Nevertheless, it is obvious that, for productive units C and D, the right benchmark is B, as it is 
demonstrated that it is possible to produce more good outputs with a lower level of bad outputs. 
The problem is that nor the strong neither the weak disposability axioms help us to determine the 
existence of such situations. In order to manage such situations, it is worth to define a new 
axiom concerning the consideration of bad outputs as strongly disposable detrimental inputs. 
Formally: 
g) Adaptation of the axiom of strong disposability of inputs to bad outputs (SDIB). 
( ) ( ), , , ,+∀ ∈ ∈ ⇒ ∈ ≥b B b g b g b bif S Sy R y y y' y y' y     (15) 
It is possible to produce the same amount of good output generating a bigger quantity of bad 
output. This axiom accepts that it is possible the existence of environmental inefficiency. 
Although it is habitual to model by-products that come jointly with production of goods as 
undesirable or bad outputs, Pitman (1981) already modelled undesirables as detrimental in-
puts in production processes, arguing that the relationship between any environmentally det-
rimental variable and desirable outputs is quite similar to the relationship that exists between 
conventional inputs and outputs. Other recent papers that also adopt this view are Tyteca 
(1997), Reinhard et al. (1999, 2002) and Prior (2005). 
According to this new technological consideration, a new linear program can be derived to 
determine the DDF for productive unit O as: 
10 
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
subject to:
, , ; , ,
 
 
1  
0
− − =
− ≥
+ ≤
− ≥
=
≥
r
g b
g
b
SDIB g b
O o o o x y y
o x
g
o y
b
o y
D g g g Max
g i
g ii
g iii
iv
v
β
β
β
β
x y y
x z J
y z G
y z B
ez
z
    (16) 
In this case, the axiom of SDIB has been introduced thought the inequality in restriction (16)-
(i). Let us, then, return to the situation depicted in Figure 2, and apply program (16) to produc-
tive units C and D, orienting the direction to expand the good output while maintaining observed 
levels of inputs and bads, i.e., we continue assuming that the direction vector is that of expres-
sion (13). It is worth noting that in both cases the good output can be respectively expanded to 
" DSIBCC B C D= = +
r
 and " DSIBDD B D D= = +
r
. This is an information very useful for the managers 
of these firms, however, the regulator should also know that firms C and D are producing a level 
of bad output over to they would require, even in the case they maximize their production of the 
good output. Summing up, if there appear situations similar to productive units C and D, even 
without limiting the production of the good output, the regulator could achieve a effective reduc-
tion in the aggregate level of the bad output, i.e., ( ) ( )b b b bC B D By y y y− + − . 
Generalising the procedure, when evaluating the efficiency of firms taking into account the 
environmental impact of the bad outputs, it could be possible the existence of complex situations 
similar to productive units C and D. For a decision making unit O, testing for this situation 
makes it necessary the definition of the following algorithm: 
1. Using a direction vector that expands desirable outputs while maintaining inputs and bad 
outputs, i.e., the direction vector adopted is that of expression (13), compute the distances 
WDB
OD
v
, SDBOD
v
 and SDIBOD
v
, from the solution of programs (11), (12) and (16). 
2. Then, compare the DDF computed under both SDB and SDIB axioms, that is, match dis-
tance SDBOD
v
up with SDIBOD
v
. 
a. If SDB SDIBO OD D>
v v
, then the maximal increase in the good outputs requires the increase 
in the bad outputs. In this case, the impact of a regulation on the bad outputs side can 
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be conventionally determined according to expression (14), through the comparison 
of DDF computed under SDB and WDB, i.e., distances SDBOD
v
 and WDBOD
v
. 
b. If SDB SDIBO OD D<
v v
, then the maximal increase in the good outputs reduces the level of 
the bad outputs. In these circumstances, the regulator can define rules to control the 
production of bad outputs that do not constrain the maximization of the good outputs. 
Consequently, ( )SDIBOO D+ v can be the right target to achieve. 
c. Finally, if SDB SDIBO OD D=
v v
, then the maximal increase in the good outputs can be 
achieved with no restrictions on the bad outputs side, and ( )SDBOO D+ v  can be a tar-
get according to the environmental perspective. 
Summing up, our algorithm allows to identify productive units showing a particular envi-
ronmental behaviour, characterised by a quite unsuccessful economic and environmental per-
formance. Identification of these complex situations can provide both firms managers and 
policy-makers with meaningful information to improve firms’ environmental performance 
and, also, to get better designs of environmental policies. Section three illustrates our method-
ology applying it to a sample of Spanish ceramic tile producers. 
3. Dataset and empirical illustration 
The dataset we use to illustrate our methodology is the same as in Picazo-Tadeo et al. 
(2005), and belongs to a cross-section sample of thirty five ceramic tile producers located at 
the region of Valencian, on the Spanish Mediterranean coast. The information comes from the 
Valencian Region Inventory of Industrial Wastes conducted in 1995 by the Department of 
Environment of the Valencian Regional Government. All firms in the sample share the same 
productive process, producing ceramic goods through the use of an intermediate input, clay, 
kaolin, felspar and limestones, and two primary production factors, labour and capital. The 
production process also generates two undesirable products, watery mud and used oil. Output 
is measured in monetary units, while labour and capital factors are respectively proxied by 
energy consumption and the number of workers. Finally, intermediate input and bad outputs 
are all measured in physical units. Descriptive statistics for the data are presented in Table 1. 
[Table 1 about here] 
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In order to apply our algorithm to this dataset and testing for the possible existence of 
complex situations, we have computed the DDF of expressions (11), (12) and (16) assuming, 
as proposed, a direction that expands desirable output while maintaining inputs and bad out-
puts6, i.e., the direction vector is that of expression (13). Under this direction vector, the ex-
pression for the DDF becomes: 
( ) ( ), , ;0,1,0 Sup , ,g b g bD Sβ β⎡ ⎤= + ∈⎣ ⎦x y y x y yr      (17) 
This distance measures the extent to which a firm could increase its production of good 
output, while maintaining inputs and bads. In other words, given their endowment of inputs, it 
could be possible for inefficient tile firms to move to cleaner environmental-friendly produc-
tive plans that would enable them to produce more ceramic pavements while holding the same 
amount of watery mud and used oil. Since the amount of ceramic pavements increases with 
constant amount of bads, the ratio of each bad output per unit of good output will decrease. 
Comparing the DDF computed under the assumptions of SDB and SDIB, i.e., the solutions 
to programs (11) and (12), shows, on the one hand, that 29 firms (out of 35) present a behav-
iour corresponding to the basic situation depicted in Figure 1 (see Table 2). For these firms, 
the maximal increase in their production of ceramic pavements, requires an increase in the 
production of watery mud and used oil. When no regulation is assumed and wastes can be 
freely disposed, the aggregate desirable output produced by these firms could be augmented 
by 25 per cent, figure that amounts to 64,915 thousands of euros, with an average of 2,238 
thousands per firm. Besides, eleven firms behave efficiently in this unregulated scenario, i.e., 
their computed DDF equals to zero. In opposition, when it is assumed a regulated scenario 
and disposing wastes becomes a costly activity, the maximum attainable aggregate expansion 
of goods goes down to 16,982 thousands of euros (586 euros per firm), showing that envi-
ronmental regulations have an opportunity cost measurable in terms of a lower feasible ex-
pansion of desirable outputs. In this case, the reduced production of ceramic pavements due to 
inefficiency represents 6.5 per cent of the total good output produced by these firms. In the 
regulated scenario, twenty two tile firms show an efficient behaviour. 
[Table 2 about here] 
                                                          
6 Notice that this direction changes the left hand side of restrictions (i), (ii) and (iii) in expressions (11), (12) and 
(16) to ox , ( )go β+y  and boy , respectively. 
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For these ceramic firms behaving according what we have termed the basic situation, the 
impact of environmental regulation can be conventionally computed as stated by expression 
(14), i.e., as the difference between the potential increases of ceramic pavements under both 
the unregulated and regulated scenarios. Figures on regulatory impacts are reported on the 
third column of Table 2. When it is assumed that environmental rules prevent free disposal of 
bads, in aggregate terms these ‘well behaved’ producers would have to renounce to a poten-
tial increase of desirable output of 47,933 thousands of euros (1,653 per firm). This figure 
amounts to 18.5 per cent of their observed aggregated production of ceramic pavements. 
On the other hand, comparison of DDF computed under the SDB and SDIB axioms also 
reveals that the behaviour of the six remaining firms (decision making units 1, 7, 11, 13, 24 
and 27) corresponds to what we have denominated the complex situation depicted in Figure 2 
(see the last column of Table 2). In particular, firm number 13 displays a behaviour analogous 
to productive unit C, while firms 1, 7, 11, 24 and 27 are productive units similar to point D. 
The traditional approach to the measurement of the impact of environmental regulations on 
firms performance, i.e., the simple comparison of DDF computed under both SDB and WDB, 
would lead to assess that, given their respective inputs vectors, no chance exists for the five 
firms type D to attain increases of their production of ceramic pavements, neither under the 
unregulated scenario nor under the regulated one. On the contrary, by behaving efficiently, 
the only firm type C in our sample (decision making unit number 13) could increase its pro-
duction of ceramic pavements by 1,821 thousands of euros, under both the unregulated and 
regulated scenarios. Accordingly, environmental regulation is not binding for productive units 
type C and D, and their regulatory impact index equals to zero. 
Nevertheless, computation of the DDF for tile firms showing a complex behaviour under 
the axiom of SDIB, i.e., considering bads as strong disposable detrimental inputs, displays a 
picture somewhat different. In the light of this new technological consideration, these six pro-
ductive units could attain an aggregate increase in their production of ceramic pavements of 
13,026 thousands of euros, without additional consumption of inputs, with an average per 
firm of 2,171 thousands of euros. Doubtless, this is an information of great interest for the 
managers of these firms. Nonetheless, regulating authorities should also be aware that these 
tile firms are producing a level of bad output over to they would require, even in the case they 
maximize their production of ceramic pavements. In this situation, an effective reduction in the 
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aggregate level of watery mud and used oil could be achieved by environmental-friendly regula-
tions, without limiting the production of the good output. 
4. Concluding remarks 
Environmental performance is a major matter of concern for both firms’ managers and 
academics in the field of environmental economics. Besides, the growing recognition of the 
environment as a public good in the industrialised countries has stimulated wide-ranging leg-
islation aimed at achieving predetermined standards of environmental quality. This setting 
calls for new methods to evaluate the environmental performance of firms and the impact of 
environmental-friendly regulations on their productive activity. 
In this paper we propose the use of directional distance functions to test for the existence of 
firms behaving accordingly to what we call complex situations, corresponding to productive 
units showing a quite unsuccessful economic and environmental performance. We show that 
when the biggest polluter is not the greater producer, by enforcing adequate environmental 
regulations, public authorities could achieve an effective reduction on the production of bads, 
without affecting the level of goods. Furthermore, we illustrate our methodological proposal 
with an empirical application to a sample of cross-section data of Spanish tile producers. 
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Table 1.- Sample description. 
Variable Measurement unit Mean Standarddeviation
Desirable output   
Ceramic pavements Euros (thousands) 8,814.1 11,470.0
Undesirable outputs   
Watery mud Tons 1,725.9 3,411.6
Used oil Kilograms 1,537.4 2,460.5
Inputs   
Clay, kaolin, felspar and limestones Tons 58,182.3 102,559.3
Labour Number of workers 87.0 101.5
Capital Kilowatts-hour (thousands) 3,408.4 4,006.8
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Table 2.- Computed distance functions, regulatory impacts and type of firms. 
 Bads as undesirable outputs 
Bads as strong 
disposable inputs 
 
Firm 
Unregulated 
scenario (SDB) 
Regulated
scenario (WDB)
Regulatory 
impact index SDIB Firm type 
1 0 0 0 1,151 D 
2 0 0 0 0 - 
3 3,918 0 3,918 0 - 
4 2,624 1,208 1,416 1,208 - 
5 0 0 0 0 - 
6 1,113 184 929 228 - 
7 0 0 0 2,274 D 
8 16,274 11,551 4,723 11,551 - 
9 0 0 0 0 - 
10 0 0 0 0 - 
11 0 0 0 3,171 D 
12 0 0 0 0 - 
13 1,821 1,821 0 4,269 C 
14 0 0 0 0 - 
15 433 0 433 0 - 
16 12,215 0 12,215 0 - 
17 0 0 0 0 - 
18 2,693 0 2,693 0 - 
19 1,327 0 1,327 0 - 
20 1,149 0 1,149 535 - 
21 7,270 539 6,731 759 - 
22 2,011 700 1,311 588 - 
23 0 0 0 0 - 
24 0 0 0 1,479 D 
25 0 0 0 0 - 
26 1,449 0 1,449 0 - 
27 0 0 0 682 D 
28 336 0 336 0 - 
29 0 0 0 0 - 
30 3,241 0 3,241 0 - 
31 2,461 0 2,461 375 - 
32 596 0 596 0 - 
33 3,703 1,880 1,823 1,999 - 
34 2,102 920 1,182 920 - 
35 0 0 0 0 - 
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Figure 1.- Weak and strong disposability of bad outputs (I): the basic situation. 
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Figure 3.- Weak and strong disposability of bad outputs (III): the long-run perspective. 
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